Toplines

Russia resumed its combined missile and drone strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of February 2 to 3, following the brief moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on February 3 that Russian forces launched 450 drones and 71 missiles at Ukraine overnight.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship cruise missiles from occupied Crimea, 32 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Bryansk Oblast and occupied Crimea, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from the Bryansk Oblast airspace, and 28 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea and Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 450 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 300 were Shahed drones — from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukraine downed 412 drones, the four Zirkon/Onyx missiles, 11 Iskander-M/S-300 missiles, three Kh-22/32 missiles, and 20 Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 27 missiles and 31 drones hit 27 locations and that drone debris fell at 17 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the drones and missiles struck energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, and Odesa oblasts.[2] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck combined heat and power plants (CHPP) and substations in Kyiv City and caused complete heat outages in the city’s Darnytskyi and Dniprovskyi raions that affected 1,170 high-rise buildings.[3] Russian forces reportedly struck energy infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, including CHPP-5 and two substations in Kharkiv City, prompting Ukrainian officials to declare a local state of emergency and leaving over 200,000 consumers without power.[4] Russian forces also reportedly struck thermal power plants in Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, and Odesa oblasts.[5] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes against energy infrastructure left 50 settlements in Vinnytsia Oblast and over 50,000 energy consumers in Odesa Oblast without power.[6]

Russia’s overnight strike package contained an unusually high number of ballistic missiles, consistent with the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to stockpile missiles to maximize damage against civilian infrastructure. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces used a strike package that was 1.5 times larger than the strike packages Russian forces launched before the trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Abu Dhabi on January 23-24.[7] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat assessed on February 3 that it appears that Russian forces adopted strike packages containing larger numbers of ballistic missiles because these missiles are more difficult for Ukraine to intercept.[8] Ihnat reported that the Kh-22/32, Zirkon, Onyx, and Iskander-M missiles all have a ballistic or semi-ballistic flight path. Ihnat stated that only 10 of the 38 missiles that Ukrainian forces downed were ballistic missiles and that the remainder were cruise missiles. Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significantly higher quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling missiles between strike series to maximize damage. Russian forces have also modified their drones and missiles to inflict more damage, including by equipping Shahed drones with mines and cluster munitions, and such measures have disproportionately affected civilian and energy infrastructure.[9] Russia’s increasingly large strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, particularly with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles.[10] Ukraine also requires partner support to maintain a diverse air defense umbrella that also incorporates interceptor drones, well-equipped mobile fire groups, fighter jets, and other kinetic and electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures.

The February 2 to 3 strike demonstrates that Russia never intended to use the energy strikes moratorium to de-escalate the war or seriously advance the US-initiated peace negotiations. Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK, reported that the overnight Russian strike was the most devastating Russian strike thus far in 2026.[11] Zelensky stated that the energy strikes moratorium was supposed to start after the January 23-24 trilateral talks and last until the next round of talks, which were originally scheduled for February 1 but have since been rescheduled to February 4 and 5.[12] Zelensky stated that the United States proposed the moratorium to de-escalate the war and that the US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations planned to decide on further de-escalation measures in the second round of talks. The Kremlin has previously offered short-term ceasefires to falsely portray the Kremlin as acting in good faith and feign Russia’s interest in peaceful war resolution while repeatedly rejecting Ukrainian and US calls for a longer or permanent moratorium on long-range strikes or a ceasefire.[13] The Kremlin will likely attempt to portray its adherence to this short-term energy strikes moratorium as a significant concession to gain leverage in the upcoming peace talks, even though the Kremlin used these few days to stockpile missiles for a larger strike package.

The short-term moratorium does not mark a significant Russian concession, however, as Russian forces continued to target Ukrainian logistics and infrastructure during the moratorium. Zelensky noted that Russian forces struck Ukrainian railroads and other infrastructure during the few days of the energy strikes moratorium — simply switching from targeting energy infrastructure to targeting logistics.[14] Ukraine also suffered a cascading blackout on January 31 despite the energy strikes moratorium in place at that time.[15] Russian forces did not conduct any strikes against energy infrastructure on January 31 that directly caused the outage, but the Ukrainian grid was so degraded from months of Russian strikes that it could not handle a technical malfunction and suffered a widespread failure. The Kremlin agreed to the short-term strikes moratorium only after inflicting severe damage to the Ukrainian energy grid.

The Kremlin continues to explicitly reject the Western security guarantees for Ukraine that aim to prevent another Russian invasion. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Russian State Duma officials reiterated on February 2 and 3 the Kremlin’s rejections of Western security guarantees for Ukraine, again labeling such guarantees as “unacceptable” for Russia and stating that Russia would view foreign troop deployments to Ukraine as “legitimate targets.”[16] Russian State Duma deputies explicitly stated that Russia “cannot agree” to US and European security guarantees and claimed that the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine could lead to a third world war and direct military conflict between nuclear powers.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has recently stated that US-Ukrainian security guarantee agreements are ready for the parties to sign, and Kremlin officials are likely using narratives about a possible escalation leading to a nuclear war to push the United States to refuse to sign the security guarantees document out of fear. ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere, and that such threats are part of the Russian cognitive warfare effort to undermine the provision of Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[18] The Financial Times (FT) reported on February 2 that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe have been in discussions throughout December 2025 and January 2026 to create a multi-layered security guarantees agreement for post-war Ukraine to deter and defeat renewed Russian aggression.[19] FT stated that the different phases of the plans would include Western diplomatic responses, Ukrainian military responses, and a coordinated US-European military response.

The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to its original war demands for a peace settlement in Ukraine, particularly those that aim to destroy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ahead of the next round of the US-Ukraine-Russia talks in Abu Dhabi. The Russian MFA stated on February 2 that Russia must examine all peace proposals to assess if they are “acceptable for Russia” and if they comply with Russia’s war goals and objectives.[20] The MFA claimed that Ukraine is trying to avoid discussions about the “White House plan,” which the MFA claimed is based on the understandings Russia and the United States allegedly agreed upon at the August 2025 Alaska Summit. Kremlin officials have repeatedly exploited the lack of clarity about the outcome of the 2025 Alaska Summit to claim that the United States and Russia had agreed to end the war based on the original Russian demands.[21] The MFA claimed that the Alaska Summit specifically discussed the alleged “root causes” of the war (a phrase the Kremlin often uses to discuss its original war aims from 2021 and 2022) and named NATO expansion and possible Ukrainian NATO membership as a “chief” root cause. Russia issued ultimatums to the United States and NATO in December 2021 before launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, demanding “security guarantees” for Russia, such as halting the deployment of forces or weapons systems to member-states that joined NATO after 1997.[22] These demands amounted to the destruction of the current NATO alliance and a radical restructuring of the security architecture in all of Europe – a core Russian grand strategic goal that Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains to this day.[23] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been signaling that any peace deal that does not address Russia’s demands of NATO and the West outside of Ukraine will not satisfy Russia, nor lead to a lasting peace that can normalize Russian-European or US-Russian relations.[24]

The Kremlin continues to weaponize religion to demand restrictions on Ukraine’s sovereignty despite Russia’s own systematic religious repressions in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Russian MFA claimed that the Ukrainian government is destroying the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church’s (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine.[25] The MFA claimed that Russia raised its concerns about Ukraine’s alleged discrimination of the UOC MP to the United States at the Alaska Summit, where the MFA claimed Russia demanded that a peace settlement require Ukraine to repeal its 2024 law “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations” and to “restore” the rights of the UOC MP and its practitioners. The MFA asserted that a fair and lasting peace is “impossible” without the fulfillment of these demands.

The UOC MP is not an independent religious organization but rather an extension of the Russian state and an instrument of Russian hybrid warfare.[26] The UOC MP provided material support for Russia’s initial invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, and Russian soldiers used UOC MP churches as military storage depots, garrisons, field hospitals, and even fighting positions during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for example.[27] Ukraine’s 2024 law on religious organizations bans religious organizations tied to the Russian state, including the ROC.[28] The law did not ban orthodoxy in Ukraine; however, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople granted the Autocephalous (independent) Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which is unrelated to the UOC MP and ROC, independence from the Moscow Patriarchate in 2019.[29] Russia, in contrast, passed the “Yarovaya Law” in 2016, requiring all religious organizations and churches in Russia to register with the Russian government. The Russian government refuses to register undesirable religious organizations it seeks to suppress and has used the law to persecute several religious minorities.[30] Russia has applied these repressive practices to its occupation of Ukraine since 2014. Russian demands that Ukraine change its law on the ROC aim to restore the UOC MP as the Kremlin’s subversive arm in Ukraine and to dictate limits on Ukraine’s sovereignty and ability to create its own legislation.

The Kremlin continues efforts to distract attention from and secure concessions in the upcoming February 4-5 peace talks in Abu Dhabi, which will coincide with the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on February 5. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov commented on the expiration of New START on February 5, claiming that Russia’s nuclear triad is highly modernized and that Russia has created and deployed “significant resources” to guarantee its security.[31] Ryabkov claimed that no one can doubt that Russia can guarantee its security “from all sides” and implied that Russia does not need an arms race to create new weapons to ensure its security. Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to adhere to the terms of New START for another year upon its expiration, but only if the United States does the same.[32] The Kremlin has been using carrots and sticks related to New START to entice and scare the United States into conceding to Russia’s demands about Ukraine in exchange for renewed nuclear arms talks. The Kremlin is likely trying to use rhetoric about New START to influence the upcoming US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Abu Dhabi on February 4 and 5 — the final days of New START before it expires.

The Kremlin has similarly been trying to use the prospect of US-Russian economic deals to persuade the United States to give in to Russia’s demands about Ukraine.[33] The Russian MFA claimed on February 2 that US-Russian contacts about a settlement in Ukraine are important but are not the only topics that “deserve attention.”[34] The MFA claimed that Russia and the United States, as fellow “great powers,” should focus on creating mutually beneficial projects in areas where their interests align, such as hydrocarbons and critical and rare earth minerals.

The Kremlin continues to attempt to disguise and dismiss the economic impacts of its costly war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, and poor economic policy decisions. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on February 3 that Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew only one percent in 2025, compared to 4.1 percent in 2023 and 4.3 percent in 2024, but claimed that the reduction was “man-made” and part of the Russian government’s efforts to curb inflation.[35] Putin claimed that Russian inflation decreased to 5.6 percent by the end of 2025, down from Putin’s claimed high of 9.6 percent in 2024.[36] Putin acknowledged that inflation rose to 6.4 percent year-on-year in January 2026 but claimed that the Russian government expected this rise after Russia increased the value-added tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent as of January 1, 2026. The Russian government likely increased the VAT to buttress federal budget deficits that unsustainably high defense spending caused, placing the burden directly on the Russian population.[37] ISW has observed reports of sharp food price increases of up to 25 percent both before and after the VAT tax hike went into effect, suggesting that the true Russian inflation rate is higher than Putin is claiming.[38] The Kremlin’s continued false portrayal of the inflation rate aims to posture that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[39]

India is reportedly planning to curb its imports of Russian oil, which would likely further strain the Russian budget and deficit and hinder Russia’s ability to fund its war effort without more economic consequences. US President Donald Trump stated on February 2 that Indian Prime Minister Modi agreed to stop buying Russian oil and to increase purchases of US and possibly Venezuelan oil as part of US efforts to end the war in Ukraine.[40] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 3 that Russia has not received any notice from India about plans to cut off its imports of Russian oil, however.[41] India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil and continued purchasing Russian crude throughout the summer and fall of 2025 despite Western secondary tariffs against India.[42] Russian oil exports that make up a significant portion of Russia’s federal revenues have largely funded Russia’s war against Ukraine.[43] Russian revenues from oil and gas counted for roughly 30 percent of Russia’s total federal revenues in 2024 but fell 22 percent year-on-year in 2025.[44] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov further acknowledged that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales to fall by roughly 30 percent in 2026.[45] Russian officials are also reportedly privately expressing concern over Russia’s increasingly high spending deficit, despite the Kremlin’s public claims of economic stability. Unspecified sources told Bloomberg on January 31 that Russian officials are concerned that federal budget spending will exceed planned levels again in 2026.[46] Bloomberg noted that the Russian government had to drastically revise its deficit target in 2025 from 0.5 percent to 2.6 percent of its GDP. The sources stated that Russia is attempting to find as much as 1.2 trillion rubles (roughly 16 billion USD) in new sources of income to balance a key budget indicator amid declining oil and gas revenues and the unintended consequences of the strengthened ruble. Bloomberg’s calculations found that already weak crude oil prices, coupled with the impacts of Western sanctions, could leave a shortfall of nearly 2.2 trillion rubles (roughly $29 billion) in 2026.

Russian forces are starting to use Gerbera drones as “motherships” to carry strike or reconnaissance drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on February 3 that Russian forces used a Gerbera drone as a mothership drone to carry a first-person view (FPV) drone for the first time, presumably in Ukraine.[47] Flash stated that Ukrainian forces have not been able to find the original FPV drone, so it is unclear if the FPV drone was a strike or reconnaissance drone. A Russian milblogger claimed that Gerbera drones (which are the much cheaper decoy version of Russia’s Shahed/Geran drone) can fly 300 to 600 kilometers.[48] Russian forces have employed other drones, like Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones, as motherships, including to conduct strikes against Zaporizhzhia City in early October 2025.[49] These drones have significantly shorter ranges than Gerbera drones. Russian forces are trying to leverage Gerbera’s already long range to deploy smaller FPV drones further into the rear. Russian forces have also been increasingly employing mothership drones to conduct reconnaissance to enable precision strikes against Ukrainian training grounds, air defense systems, rocket launchers, manpower concentrations, and moving targets in the Ukrainian rear.[50] Gerbera mothership drones will allow Russian forces to deploy reconnaissance drones even deeper into the Ukrainian rear, increasing the number of high-value and difficult targets for Russian forces to strike. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to use air defense systems to down these small FPV drones in the deep rear, emphasizing Ukraine’s need for interceptor drones and point-defense air defense systems, as EW systems are likely insufficient to defend all Ukrainian infrastructure against a geographically pervasive threat.[51]

An unidentified drone recently crashed near a Polish military facility. Polish Radio ZET reported on February 2 that an unidentified drone crashed near an ammunition depot at Poland’s 2nd Radioelectronic Center in Przasnysz (north of Warsaw) on January 28.[52] The 2nd Radioelectronic Center supports reconnaissance and EW missions and monitors the radio space in northeastern Poland, including the Suwalki Gap. Radio ZET reported that an unspecified source stated that Polish authorities suspect that the drone was a reconnaissance drone scanning antenna arrays and that Polish forces were “helpless” and could not stop the drone. The Polish Military Gendarmerie stated on February 2 that the drone did not cause damage and that Polish authorities are investigating the incident.[53] The gendarmerie reported that preliminary findings indicate that the drone did not have a memory or SIM card. Polish authorities have not identified the actor responsible for the incident, but other European authorities have suspected Russia in other drone incidents over European military infrastructure in recent months.[54] ISW continues to assess that Russia is engaged in its “Phase Zero” effort — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[55]